### GV103: Introduction to International Relations

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Systemic Forces

### Introduction

- Two goals for this lecture
  - Discuss how strong hegemons foster peace
  - Evaluate implications for high fatality wars

# A Model of Bargaining in Shadow of Intervention

- Everything the same as in previous lecture, except
  - If a war occurs, H must decide whether to assist D
  - If H does not, w<sub>b</sub> the same as before

• If H does, 
$$w_m = \frac{e_C m_C}{e_C m_C + e_D m_D + e_H m_H}$$

Outcomes	u <sub>C</sub>	$u_D$	u <sub>H</sub>
peace	X	1-x	$\iota(1-x)$
bilateral war	$w_b - c_C$	$1-w_b-c_D$	$\iota(1-w_b)$
multilateral war	$w_m - c_C$	$1-w_m-c_D$	$\iota(1-w_m)-c_H$

# Analysis

#### Weak hegemon

- If war occurs, would not intervene
- Anticipating this, C sets  $x = \overline{x}_b$  iff  $\phi > \hat{\phi}_b$

• Where 
$$\hat{\phi}_b \equiv \frac{c_C + c_D}{\overline{w}_b - w_b + c_C + c_D}$$

• Exists when 
$$c_H \geq \iota(\underline{\underline{w}}_b - \underline{\underline{w}}_m)$$

#### Strong hegemon

- If war occurs, would intervene
- Anticipating this, C sets  $x=\overline{\mathbf{x}}_{m}$  iff  $\phi>\hat{\phi}_{m}$

• Where 
$$\hat{\phi}_m \equiv \frac{c_C + c_D}{\overline{w}_m - \underline{w}_m + c_C + c_D}$$

• Exists when  $c_H < \iota(\underline{\underline{w}}_b - \underline{\underline{w}}_m)$ 

#### Data

- Observations: int'l system from 1821 to 2001 (5 year blocs)
- y: number of wars that began in that 5 year bloc
  - Includes interstate, extrastate, and civil wars
  - For some models, no exclusion based on fatalities
  - ullet For others, only count wars with >10,000 fatalities
- xs: strongest state's share of m (top two, top three)

## Results

	# of Wars of (All)		# of High Fatality Wars	
Top Two	+*		-*	
Top Three		+*		_*