

Crisis Bargaining and Domestic Opposition

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- 1 Introduction
 - The Puzzle
- 2 Formal Analysis
 - The Model
 - Primary Results
- 3 Conclusion
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- Democratic governance → “better” decision making
- Democs only fight wars they can win quickly and easily
- Perhaps true in aggregate, but not for USA
- What does this tell us?
- Might democratic governance itself be responsible?

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The Model

- Some **foreign** state issues **ultimatum** to a **democratic** state
- Domestic opposition publicly advocates either peace or war
- Government either accepts ultimatum or goes to war
- If war, and if opposition initially advocated war, at some point can advocate quitting or continuing to fight
- Government eventually chooses between quitting and continuing to fight
- Settlements government can impose on foreign state vary by length of fighting

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Key Assumptions

- Foreign state cares only about **distributive** outcome, **costs**
- Actors w/in demo care about same, plus electoral implications
- When government's behavior differs from that advocated by opposition, foreign policy weighs more heavily in future elect
- Good outcomes help and bad outcomes hurt government more when this happens
- Opposition strictly prefers outcomes favorable to “national interest” to unfavorable ones
- Electoral concerns thus of secondary importance
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Primary Results

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