

PSC 102: Intro to International Politics

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International Institutions

Introduction

- Two goals for this lecture
 - Demonstrate **empirically** that UN **peacekeeping is effective** when both sides want peace
 - Prove that international institutions need only **monitor, report** on bad behavior in order to **deter** it

Data

- Observations: matched sets of very similar civil wars
- Dependent variables: duration of war, postwar peace
- Independent variable: UN PKO

Table 5. Matched pairs, in-war sample

Treated, Month	Control, Month
El Salvador Jul 1991	Mozambique Jul 1988
Croatia Feb 1992	Moldova Apr 1994
Croatia Jan 1995	Moldova Mar 1992
Bosnia and Herzegovina Jun 1992	Azerbaijan Feb 1992
Georgia Aug 1993	Azerbaijan Dec 1992
Liberia Sep 1993	Senegal Oct 2000
Sierra Leone Jul 1998	Nicaragua Mar 1989
Zaire Dec 1999	Zaire Oct 1997
Rwanda Jun 1993	Rwanda Feb 2000
Somalia Apr 1992	Sri Lanka Oct 1994
Angola Dec 1988	Afghanistan Oct 1992
Lebanon Jan 1988	Burundi Oct 2002
Tajikistan Dec 1994	Azerbaijan Feb 1994
Tajikistan Jan 1998	Azerbaijan Jan 1992
Cambodia Oct 1991	Nicaragua Nov 1989
Indonesia Oct 1999	Myanmar (Burma) Apr 2000

Table 2. Matched pairs, post-conflict sample

Treated, peace period start date	Control, peace period start date
Haiti Jan 1992	Panama Nov 1989
Guatemala Jan 1996	Paraguay Mar 1989
El Salvador Jan 1992	Peru Jan 2000
Nicaragua Jan 1990	Paraguay Mar 1989
Croatia Jan 1994	Azerbaijan Aug 1994
Croatia Jan 1996	Azerbaijan Aug 1994
Serbia and Montenegro Jul 1999	Serbia and Montenegro Jan 1992
Bosnia and Herzegovina Jan 1996	Azerbaijan Aug 1994
Georgia Jan 1994	Moldova Aug 1992
Liberia Sep 1995	Guinea-Bissau June 1999
Sierra Leone Jan 2001	Burundi Jan 1993
Zaire Jan 2002	Zaire Jan 1998
Rwanda Jan 1995	Burundi Jan 1993
Mozambique Nov 1992	Somalia Jan 1997
Namibia Jan 1990	Chad Jan 1989
Morocco Jan 1990	Iraq Jan 1997
Lebanon Jan 1991	Azerbaijan Aug 1994
Tajikistan Jan 1997	Azerbaijan Aug 1994
Tajikistan Jan 1999	Niger Jan 1998

Results

	Duration of war	Postwar peace
UN PKO	—	+*

Baseline Model of Crises when Bargains Can't be Enforced

- B decides whether to secretly engage in bad behavior
- A decides whether to go to war with B
- $u_A(\text{peace}|\text{good}) = 1$, $u_B(\text{peace}|\text{good}) = 1$
- $u_A(\text{peace}|\text{bad}) = 0$, $u_B(\text{peace}|\text{bad}) = \tau$
- $u_A(\text{war}|\text{good}) = 1 - c_A$, $u_B(\text{war}|\text{good}) = 1 - c_B$
- $u_A(\text{war}|\text{bad}) = 1 - \iota - c_A$, $u_B(\text{war}|\text{bad}) = \tau\iota - c_B$
- A knows $pr(\tau = \underline{\tau}) = \phi$ and $pr(\tau = \bar{\tau}) = 1 - \phi$
- Where $\underline{\tau} < 1 < \bar{\tau}$

Analysis

- Punitive War Equilibrium

- B engages in bad behavior iff red
- A goes to war, which is potentially unnecessary
- Exists iff $\bar{\tau} > \frac{1}{\iota}$ and $\phi < 1 - \hat{\rho}$, where $\hat{\rho} \equiv \frac{c_A}{1 - \iota}$

- Permissive Peace Equilibrium

- B engages in bad behavior iff red
- A does not go to war
- Exists iff $\bar{\tau} > \frac{1}{\iota}$ and $\phi \geq 1 - \hat{\rho}$

- Mixed Strategy Equilibrium

- B sometimes behaves badly if red, never if blue
- A sometimes goes to war
- Only equilibrium when $\bar{\tau} \leq \frac{1}{\iota}$

Adding Institutions

- Now suppose there exists an institution that monitors B
- If B engages in bad behavior, detected w/ probability r
- Assume institution issues report whenever this happens
- A observes whether report issued before making decision
- Let ρ denote the probability that B behaves badly
 - $\rho = \rho_n$ when institution does not issue report, 1 when they do
 - If B behaves badly iff red, $\rho_n = \frac{(1-r)(1-\phi)}{(1-r)(1-\phi) + \phi}$
 - If B never behaves badly, $\rho_n = 0$

The Impact of Institutions

- Previously discuss equilibria still exist
 - Institution has no effect on A 's behavior in these equilibria
 - $\bar{\tau}$ relative to $\frac{1}{\iota}$ determines PWE or PPE possible
 - If they are, size of ρ_n relative to $\hat{\rho}$ determines which
- Deterrent Equilibrium
 - A goes to war iff institution issues report
 - B does not behave badly, even if red
 - Requires $\bar{\tau} < \frac{1 - r c_B}{1 - r + r \iota}$