

GV103

Introduction to International Relations

2016–2017

Take-Home Test

Question 1 deals with material that was discussed in Lecture R1 (Puzzles of International Relations).

1. Some people argue that the reason why wars occur is that it is in our nature as human beings to be violent, greedy, and intolerant. Which of the following was **not** offered as a criticism of such explanations?
 1. Recent research suggests that violence, greed, and intolerance are not natural but are instead products of socialisation.
 2. Constants cannot be used to explain variables.
 3. Wars are far rarer than most people appreciate.
 4. None of the above

Questions 2 and 3 deal with material that was discussed in Lecture R2 (Science as Simplification).

2. Which of the following statements is consistent with the view of scientific inquiry expressed in the lecture?
 1. One of the primary uses of theoretical models is to identify patterns of association amongst experimental or observational data.
 2. One of the primary uses of empirical models is to clarify the precise mechanism through which one variable impacts another.
 3. Models built on false assumptions are like houses built on rotten foundations—they are bound to collapse sooner or later.
 4. The appropriateness of an assumption is not judged unconditionally but instead best viewed as purpose-relative.

3. Which of the following is an example of a question concerning causes of effects as opposed to one concerning effects of causes?
 1. How does foreign aid influence economic development?
 2. Why are some countries so rich while others are so poor?
 3. Both 1 and 2
 4. Neither 1 nor 2

Questions 4 through 7 deal with material that was discussed in Lecture R3 (Statistical Analysis).

4. Below is the abstract from a recent article in a prominent scholarly journal of international relations. Which of the following constitute the implicit dependent and independent variables (in that order)?
 1. Coalition formation; leader job security
 2. Leader job security; coalition formation
 3. Coalition formation; military prospects
 4. Military prospects; coalition formation

States frequently form military coalitions, and these collaborations matter a great deal for international politics, yet their origins are poorly understood. Building coalitions in international crises improves military prospects. At the same time, it requires policy concessions to compensate partners. We show that a national leaders job security affects her willingness to make this tradeoff. First, politically insecure leaders are more willing to form coalitions than secure leaders. The former face greater incentives to accept tradeoffs in order to bolster their chances of victory and thereby improve their chances of remaining in power. Second, politically insecure leaders are also less selective in their choice of partners. Their willingness to make larger policy concessions leads them to form coalitions with states of increasingly divergent foreign policy preferences. A sample of crises from 1951-1999 provides statistical support for these arguments.

5. Below is the abstract from a recent article in a prominent scholarly journal of international relations. Which of the following constitute the implicit dependent and independent variables (in that order)?
1. State management of aid; outsourcing to nonstate actors
 2. Outsourcing to nonstate actors; state management of aid
 3. Market orientation; support for state management of aid
 4. Support for state management of aid; market orientation

In response to corruption and inefficient state institutions in recipient countries, some foreign aid donors outsource the delivery of aid to nonstate development actors. Other donor governments continue to support state management of aid, seeking to strengthen recipient states. These cross-donor differences can be attributed in large measure to different national orientations about the appropriate role of the state in public service delivery. Countries that place a high premium on market efficiency (for example, the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden) will outsource aid delivery in poorly governed recipient countries to improve the likelihood that aid reaches the intended beneficiaries of services. In contrast, states whose political economies emphasize a strong state in service provision (for example, France, Germany, Japan) continue to support state provision. This argument is borne out by a variety of tests, including statistical analysis of dyadic time-series cross-section aid allocation data and individual-level survey data on a cross-national sample of senior foreign aid officials. To understand different aid policies, one needs to understand the political economies of donors.

6. Less than 1% of the states that have committed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) developed nuclear weapons after doing so. (North Korea developed nuclear weapons after acceding to the treaty, though it later withdrew from the NPT.) In contrast, 50% of the states that never signed the NPT have developed nuclear weapons since the treaty went into force in 1970. (India tested its first nuclear weapon in 1974; Pakistan did so in 1998; Israel is widely believed to have been in possession of nuclear weapons since 1967; and South Sudan, the only other non-signatory, has no known nuclear program.) **On the basis of this information alone**, we can conclude that the NPT
1. causes states who sign it to be more likely to proliferate.
 2. causes states who sign it to be less likely to proliferate.
 3. has no causal impact on whether states choose to proliferate.
 4. None of the above
7. The following table reports the results of an analysis of every dyad-year from 1945 to 2005. The dependent variable is the level of bilateral trade. The independent variable is the number of years the two states have been at peace with one another since 1816. **On the basis of this information alone**, which of the following conclusions can be drawn?
1. Wars between states cause them to have higher levels of trade than they would otherwise have.
 2. There is a negative and statistically significant association between peace and bilateral trade.
 3. Both 1 and 2
 4. Neither 1 nor 2


	Bilateral Trade
Years of Peace	—*

Questions 8 through 10 deal with material that was discussed in Lecture R4 (Game Theory).

8. In the following normal form game, how many equilibria are there?
- 1
 - 2
 - 3
 - 4

	left	right
up	30, 15	10, 20
down	40, 5	20, 10

9. Suppose that large scale protests broke out in Beijing. Let the following extensive form game serve as a simple model of subsequent decisions by the Chinese and US governments. First, the Chinese government must decide whether to allow the protests to continue or to crack down on them violently. If the Chinese government allows the protests to continue, the game ends, and the Chinese government loses some amount of utility, the size of which is determined by p . If the Chinese government instead chooses to crack down, the US government then decides between imposing sanctions, which does harm to both economies (costing both sides to lose s utility) and maintaining trade ties, which might upset voters in the US but would be ideal from the perspective of China's government. The domestic reaction in the US is expected to cost the US government to lose d utility. According to this model, the US would impose sanctions on China if and only if
- p is less than s .
 - p is greater than s .
 - s is less than d .
 - s is greater than d .



10. For the Chinese government to allow protests in equilibrium, according to the same model as above, it must be true that
1. s is less than both d and p .
 2. p is less than s and s is less than d .
 3. p is less than s but s is greater than d .
 4. None of the above

Question 11 deals with material that was discussed in Lecture R5 (Theories of IR).

11. Which of the following arguments accurately reflects the core assumptions of the explanatory theory of IR with which it is paired?
 1. States do not enter into formal military alliances lightly, because the costs of violating an international agreement are high and a state's security interests are constantly changing; neo-realism.
 2. One of the primary reasons that democratic states are more likely to join international institutions than are authoritarian states is that the benefits of membership tend to be shared broadly while the costs are mostly born by elites, and democratic leaders are more accountable to the general public while authoritarian leaders are more accountable to elites; neo-liberalism.
 3. Both 1 and 2
 4. Neither 1 nor 2

Questions 12 through 15 deal with material that was discussed in Lecture R6 (Foregone Benefits of Cooperation).

12. Suppose we have two states that each require 4 units of \mathcal{E} per month and would like to consume as many units of \mathcal{L} as possible. It takes 1 week to produce the first unit of either \mathcal{E} or \mathcal{L} . After the first week, though, things start to get easier. The second consecutive week of producing of \mathcal{E} yields 3 units, and the second consecutive week of producing \mathcal{L} yields 4 units. The third consecutive week of producing of \mathcal{E} yields 4 units and the third consecutive week of producing \mathcal{L} yields 10 units. (No further increases in productivity occur thereafter.) If the two states pursue self-sufficiency, how many units of \mathcal{L} will each consume per month?
 1. 3
 2. 4
 3. 5
 4. None of the above

13. In the scenario described by the previous question, how many total units of \mathcal{L} would be produced if one state did nothing but produce \mathcal{L} each month and the other only started producing \mathcal{L} after it had produced enough \mathcal{E} to satisfy the monthly needs of both states?
1. 15
 2. 25
 3. 30
 4. None of the above
14. As discussed in the lecture, trade benefits all states in aggregate, but not because transporting goods across borders does anything special by itself. Rather, the benefits stem from ____, which is only possible if states specialize in producing those goods for which they have ____.
1. minimizing opportunity costs; an absolute advantage.
 2. minimizing opportunity costs; a comparative advantage.
 3. minimizing production costs; an absolute advantage.
 4. minimizing production costs; a comparative advantage.
15. Which of the following is consistent with the arguments presented in the lecture concerning the advantages and disadvantages of different types of exchange rates?
1. The downside to floating exchange rates is that their adoption requires governments to give up control over their monetary policy.
 2. The upside to floating exchange rates is that their adoption promotes trade by limiting uncertainty.
 3. Both 1 and 2
 4. Neither 1 nor 2

Questions 16 through 18 deal with material that was discussed in Lecture R7 (Coordination Problems).

16. When states face a coordination problem,
 1. it can be difficult to arrive at a cooperative outcome, but should they do so, that outcome will be stable.
 2. it is unlikely that they will arrive at a cooperative outcome, and even if they did, the outcome would not be stable.
 3. Both **1** and **2**
 4. Neither **1** nor **2**

17. In the Model of Coordination presented in the lecture, the difference between $\bar{\beta}$ and $\underline{\beta}$ is that
 1. $\bar{\beta}$ represents the benefit of running into the other player at the less preferred location, while $\underline{\beta}$ represents the benefit of doing so at the more preferred location.
 2. $\bar{\beta}$ represents the benefit of running into the other player at the more preferred location, while $\underline{\beta}$ represents the benefit of doing so at the less preferred location.
 3. $\bar{\beta}$ represents the benefit of running into the other player, while $\underline{\beta}$ represents the benefit of being at one's preferred location.
 4. $\bar{\beta}$ represents the benefit of being at one's preferred location, while $\underline{\beta}$ represents the benefit of running into the other player.

18. In the Model of Coordination presented in the lecture, as $\underline{\beta}$ and $\bar{\beta}$ grow farther apart (that is, as either $\underline{\beta}$ decreases or $\bar{\beta}$ increases),
 1. it becomes more likely that both players choose to go to Top Bar.
 2. it becomes more likely that both players choose to go to Sub Zero.
 3. it becomes more likely that player 1 goes to Top Bar while player 2 goes to Sub Zero, and thus less likely that they see each other.
 4. it becomes more likely that they go to the same place, but we can't say which one that will be without knowing the size of p_1 and p_2 .

Questions 19 through 21 deal with material that was discussed in Lecture R8 (Collaboration Problems).

19. When states face a collaboration problem,
 1. it can be difficult to arrive at a cooperative outcome, but should they do so, that outcome will be stable.
 2. it is unlikely that they will arrive at a cooperative outcome, and even if they did, the outcome would not be stable.
 3. Both 1 and 2
 4. Neither 1 nor 2
20. In the Model of Collaboration presented in the lecture, β represented
 1. the benefit of a clean living space.
 2. the benefit of not having to clean.
 3. the probability of having a clean living space.
 4. the probability of not having to clean.
21. In the Model of Collaboration presented in the lecture, as c increases, it comes more likely that
 1. there are two equilibria; in each, one (and only one) player cleans.
 2. there is only one equilibrium; in it, both players clean.
 3. there is only one equilibrium; in it, neither player cleans.
 4. None of the above

Questions 22 through 24 deal with material that was discussed in Lecture R9 (Trust Problems).

22. Suppose that e_1 and e_2 are both positive, and both players are the blue type. Then, the mutually cooperative outcome of (allow; allow)
 1. is certain to occur.
 2. is not possible.
 3. occurs iff $\phi_1 \geq \hat{\phi}_1$ and $\phi_2 \geq \hat{\phi}_2$.
 4. occurs iff $\phi_1 < \hat{\phi}_1$ and $\phi_2 < \hat{\phi}_2$.

23. Suppose that e_1 and e_2 are both negative, and both players are the blue type. Then, the mutually cooperative outcome of (allow; allow)
1. is certain to occur.
 2. is not possible.
 3. occurs iff $\phi_1 \geq \hat{\phi}_1$ and $\phi_2 \geq \hat{\phi}_2$.
 4. occurs iff $\phi_1 < \hat{\phi}_1$ and $\phi_2 < \hat{\phi}_2$.
24. Which of the following statements best summarises the results of the statistical analysis presented in the lecture?
1. Higher levels of trust are associated with a greater probability of cooperative trade relations when the stakes are high, but have no impact when the stakes are low.
 2. Higher levels of trust are associated with a greater probability of cooperative trade relations when the stakes are low, but have no impact when the stakes are high.
 3. Higher levels of trust are associated with a greater probability of cooperative trade relations across all levels of stakes.
 4. No statistically significant pattern of association was observed between levels of trust and cooperative trade relations.

Questions 25 and 26 deal with material that was discussed in Lecture R10 (Systemic Forces).

25. As H becomes more militarily dominant over L , we might expect c_H to ____, which makes it more likely that ____.
1. increase; H does nothing
 2. increase; H demands access, which L grants
 3. decrease; H does nothing
 4. decrease; H demands access, which L grants

26. Which of the following best summarises the results of the statistical analysis presented in the lecture?
1. Global trade has been greater when the most powerful state has had a large advantage, contrary to our theoretical expectations.
 2. Global trade has been greater when the most powerful state has had a large advantage, consistent with our theoretical expectations.
 3. Global trade has been lower when the most powerful state has had a large advantage, contrary to our theoretical expectations.
 4. Global trade has been lower when the most powerful state has had a large advantage, consistent with our theoretical expectations.

Questions 27 through 29 deal with material that was discussed in Lecture R11 (International Institutions).

27. Which of the following best captures the epiphenomenal critique of international institutions?
1. All international institutions ever do is file reports, hold summits, and beg their members to increase their contributions.
 2. Across a wide range of substantive domains, a negative correlation between joint membership in international institutions and cooperative outcomes is observed.
 3. The positive correlation between joint membership in international institutions and cooperative outcomes merely reflects a greater willingness of some states to both cooperate and join institutions.
 4. None of the above
28. According to the lecture, one way that international institutions can cause cooperation that would not otherwise occur is by providing clear, common standards or expectations, which helps states to overcome
1. coordination problems.
 2. collaboration problems.
 3. trust problems.
 4. None of the above.

29. The Model of Reassurance demonstrates

1. that international institutions are indeed epiphenomenal, meaning that their net impact on the overall level of cooperation in the world is likely negligible.
2. that even if international institutions mostly were epiphenomenal, they'd still be responsible for producing cooperation that wouldn't otherwise occur.
3. that international institutions often have the ability to rearrange states' incentives, thereby alleviating collaboration problems—if they are not too severe.
4. that maths are **the worst**; though everyone already knew that, so it wasn't even useful in that regard.

Questions 30 through 33 deal with material that was discussed in Lecture R12 (Domestic Politics).

30. According to the lecture, one impact of economic globalisation has been ____ in relative inequality between the rich and the poor within highly developed countries, coupled with ____ in relative inequality between the developed world, as a whole, and the developing world.

1. a decrease; a decrease
2. a decrease; an increase
3. an increase; a decrease
4. an increase; an increase

31. Which of the following individuals might benefit from gradual increases in inflation (as opposed to runaway hyperinflation)?

1. A recent graduate from university who has no savings but does have a substantial amount of credit card and/or student loan debt
2. A successful professional with little to no personal debt, modest savings, and a home or flat that they have purchased in full
3. Both 1 and 2
4. Neither 1 nor 2

32. Which of the following individuals might be harmed by even a gradual increase in inflation (let alone runaway hyperinflation)?
1. A recent graduate from university who has no savings but does have as substantial amount of credit card and/or student loan debt
 2. A successful professional with little to no personal debt, modest savings, and a home or flat that they have purchased in full
 3. Both 1 and 2
 4. Neither 1 nor 2
33. Which of the following best summarises the results of the statistical analysis presented in the lecture?
1. WTO members exhibit higher levels of trade in manufactured goods but not agriculture, consistent with our theoretical expectations.
 2. WTO members exhibit higher levels of trade in manufactured goods but not agriculture, contrary to our theoretical expectations.
 3. WTO members exhibit higher levels of trade in agriculture but not manufactured goods, consistent with our theoretical expectations.
 4. WTO members exhibit higher levels of trade in agriculture but not manufactured goods, contrary to our theoretical expectations.

Questions 34 through 36 deal with material that was discussed in Lecture R13 (Avoidable Costs of Conflict).

34. Which of the following is **not** assumed (implicitly or explicitly) by the Model of Crisis Bargaining presented in the lecture?
1. Should D offer concessions, the size thereof is chosen by C
 2. Both C and D can anticipate the outcome of war, should it occur
 3. The bargaining space is strictly one-dimensional
 4. Compromises are always possible, even if states claim they are not

35. In the Model of Crisis Bargaining, D rejects x iff
1. war leaves D worse off than accepting x would.
 2. accepting x leaves D worse off than war would.
 3. D overestimates C 's willingness to back down.
 4. D underestimates C 's willingness to back down.
36. Which of the following summarizes the claim that war is inefficient?
1. There are less costly ways of arriving at undisputed allocations.
 2. Fighting wars is generally bad for economic growth.
 3. States that resort to violence rarely achieve their objectives.
 4. All of the above
- Questions 37 through 40** deal with material that was discussed in Lecture R14 (Commitment Problems).
37. Which of the following is a key assumption of the Model of Bargaining While Power is Shifting?
1. C does not know the value of e_D
 2. C does not know the value of m_D
 3. C would do better in future wars if C fights a war against D now
 4. C would do worse in future wars if C fights a war against D now
38. According to the lecture, when states anticipate a future shift in power
1. war may occur due to the inability of C to credibly commit to offering greater concessions after it has declined.
 2. war may occur due to the inability of D to credibly commit to not exploiting the shift once it takes place.
 3. war may occur due to the inability of either state to know when or if the shift in power has finished taking place.
 4. war may occur due to the inability of either state to commit to abiding by any agreements they might reach in the future.

39. According to the lecture, the US Civil War can be interpreted as an example of a war caused by commitment problems because
1. the Confederacy's economy was growing faster than the Union's.
 2. the Confederacy lacked control over all the agents of violence.
 3. the Union could not monitor the behavior of the Confederacy.
 4. None of the above
40. Which of the following best summarises the results of the statistical analysis presented in the lecture?
1. Both measures of the likely future distribution of military capabilities are positively associated with war, consistent with our theoretical expectations.
 2. Both measures of the likely future distribution of military capabilities are positively associated with war, contrary to our theoretical expectations.
 3. One measure of the likely future distribution of military capabilities is positively associated with war, while the other is negatively associated with war, consistent with our theoretical expectations.
 4. One measure of the likely future distribution of military capabilities is positively associated with war, while the other is negatively associated with war, contrary to our theoretical expectations.

Questions 41 through 45 deal with material that was discussed in Lecture R15 (Information Problems).

41. Which of the following is a key difference between m_D and e_D , as they are used in the Model of Bargaining While Facing Uncertainty presented in lecture?
1. m_D is assumed to be observable, e_D unobservable
 2. m_D does not influence w , but e_D does
 3. Neither **1** nor **2**
 4. Both **1** and **2**

42. The dilemma C faces when uncertain about what terms D will accept, as they are in the theoretical model presented in lecture, is that they must always either risk war or risk
1. revealing that they are low in martial effectiveness.
 2. missing an opportunity to get a better deal from D .
 3. returning to an unfavorable status quo.
 4. allowing power to shift in D 's favor.
43. In the theoretical model presented in lecture, when $\phi > \hat{\phi}$, C will
1. set $x = \underline{x}$, thereby ensuring peace.
 2. set $x = \underline{x}$, thereby risking war.
 3. set $x = \bar{x}$, thereby risking war.
 4. set $x = \bar{x}$, thereby ensuring war.
44. In the theoretical model presented in lecture, when $\phi \leq \hat{\phi}$, C will
1. set $x = \underline{x}$, thereby ensuring peace.
 2. set $x = \underline{x}$, thereby risking war.
 3. set $x = \bar{x}$, thereby risking war.
 4. set $x = \bar{x}$, thereby ensuring war.
45. The measure of parity discussed in the lecture
1. reflects the weaker state's share of total dyadic military capabilities.
 2. ranges from 0 (complete preponderance) to 0.5 (complete parity).
 3. Neither **1** nor **2**
 4. Both **1** and **2**

46. Which of the following best summarises the results of the statistical analysis presented in the lecture?
1. Parity is positively associated with war onset, consistent with our theoretical expectations.
 2. Parity is positively associated with war onset, contrary to our theoretical expectations.
 3. Parity is negatively associated with war onset, consistent with our theoretical expectations.
 4. Parity is negatively associated with war onset, contrary to our theoretical expectations.

Questions 47 and 48 deal with material that was discussed in Lecture R16 (Systemic Forces).

47. As H becomes more militarily dominant, we might expect c_H to ____, which makes it more likely that ____.
1. increase; H intervenes on behalf of C
 2. increase; H intervenes on behalf of D
 3. decrease; H intervenes on behalf of C
 4. decrease; H intervenes on behalf of D
48. Which of the following best summarises the results of the statistical analysis presented in the lecture?
1. The incidence of wars with very high fatalities has been greater when the most powerful state has had a large advantage, consistent with our theoretical expectations.
 2. The incidence of wars with very high fatalities has been greater when the most powerful state has had a large advantage, contrary to our theoretical expectations.
 3. The incidence of wars with very high fatalities has been lower when the most powerful state has had a large advantage, consistent with our theoretical expectations.
 4. The incidence of wars with very high fatalities has been lower when the most powerful state has had a large advantage, contrary to our theoretical expectations.

Questions 49 and 50 deal with material that was discussed in Lecture R17 (International Institutions).

49. Which of the following best summarises the results of the statistical analysis presented in the lecture?
1. There is a negative association between peacekeeping operations deployed during a civil war and the length of that war, but a positive association between peacekeeping operations deployed after a civil war has ended and the length of postwar peace.
 2. There is a negative association between peacekeeping operations deployed during a civil war and the length of that war, as well as a negative association between peacekeeping operations deployed after a civil war has ended and the length of postwar peace.
 3. There is no significant association between peacekeeping operations deployed during a civil war and the length of that war, but a positive association between peacekeeping operations deployed after a civil war has ended and the length of postwar peace.
 4. There is no significant association between peacekeeping operations deployed during a civil war and the length of that war, but a negative association between peacekeeping operations deployed after a civil war has ended and the length of postwar peace.
50. According to the Model of Bargaining with Institutional Oversight, the willingness of rogue states to violate international norms or adopt policies that threaten the international status quo
1. is unaffected by international institutions because those institutions lack enforcement power.
 2. can be constrained by international institutions even if they lack enforcement power.
 3. will appear to be lower in the presence of international institutions, but not because of a causal relationship.
 4. will appear to be higher in the presence of international institutions, but not because of a causal relationship.

Questions 52 and 52 deal with material that was discussed in Lecture R18 (Domestic Politics).

51. According to the lecture, one of the primary reasons we might be skeptical that democracies seldom fight wars against one another **because** they are both democratic is that
 1. democratic leaders may have no more reason to fear defeat in war than autocratic leaders, taking into account differences in their likely postwar fates.
 2. democracy takes many forms, making any statement about the conflict behavior of democratic states as a whole, and their relations with one another, inherently suspect.
 3. there is no statistical evidence of a pattern of association, positive or negative, between joint democracy and the onset of war, regardless of which other variables we include.
 4. None of the above

52. Which of the following best summarises the results of the statistical analysis presented in the lecture?
 1. When we fail to account for territorial disagreements between states, joint democracy appears to be positively associated with war; once we do so, however, we find a negative association between joint democracy and war.
 2. When we fail to account for territorial disagreements between states, joint democracy appears to be positively associated with war; once we do so, however, we find no association between joint democracy and war.
 3. When we fail to account for territorial disagreements between states, joint democracy appears to be negatively associated with war; once we do so, however, we find a positive association between joint democracy and war.
 4. When we fail to account for territorial disagreements between states, joint democracy appears to be negatively associated with war; once we do so, however, we find no association between joint democracy and war.

Questions 53 through 55 deal with material that was discussed in Lecture R19 (Terrorism).

53. Which of the following would **not** constitute an act of terrorism, according to the definition provided in the lecture?
1. Islamists killing UK troops during a battle over control of a city.
 2. An environmentalist sabotaging an offshore oil rig.
 3. An evangelical Christian bombing an abortion clinic.
 4. A white nationalist opening fire in a Sikh temple during services.
54. According to the Model of Government Coercion,
1. groups that resort to violence are less likely to be granted concessions than those that choose peaceful means of applying pressure, proving that violence doesn't solve anything.
 2. groups that resort to violence are less likely to be granted concessions than those that choose peaceful means of applying pressure, but only because they were in a worse position to begin with.
 3. groups that resort to violence are more likely to be granted concessions than those that choose peaceful means of applying pressure, proving that violence is often effective, sad as that may be.
 4. groups that resort to violence are more likely to be granted concessions than those that choose peaceful means of applying pressure, but only because they were in a better position to begin with.
55. According to the lecture, terrorism as provocation seeks to
1. convince the population that the group responsible for the attacks claims to represent that the group is more worthy of their support than are other groups claiming to represent the same population.
 2. ensure that the target government does not reach an agreement with a more moderate faction or organization claiming to represent the same population as the group responsible for the attacks.
 3. Neither **1** nor **2**
 4. Both **1** and **2**

Questions 56 through 60 deal with material that was discussed in Lecture R20 (Insurgency).

56. Which of the following is consistent with the arguments related to identity and conflict that were presented in lecture?
1. Individual-level decisions of whom group to support in a civil war appear to be primarily driven by group identities.
 2. Individual identities appear to be largely immutable, in that they are unaffected by political, economic, and social circumstances.
 3. States with higher levels of ethno-linguistic diversity are more likely to experience civil war than are states with lower levels thereof.
 4. Patterns of armed conflict may explain identity cleavages rather than identity cleavages explaining armed conflict.
57. Which of the following is consistent with the findings of the studies related to identity and conflict that were discussed in the lecture?
1. In Malawi, Chewa and Tumbuka politicians have few incentives to work together and the two groups exhibit high levels of hostility towards one another, while in Zambia, Chewa and Tumbuka politicians need a broad base of support and the two groups exhibit lower levels of hostility towards one another.
 2. Individuals living in states that recently experienced a civil war are more likely to self-identify on the basis of ethnicity, while those living in states that recently experience interstate disputes are more likely to self-identify on the basis of nationality.
 3. In Sierra Leone, poor people were more likely than others to fight on behalf of the RUF, but were also more likely than others to fight on behalf of the CDF, which sought to restore the government overthrown by the RUF.
 4. All of the above

58. In the Model of Crisis Bargaining Within States, x represented ____ while y represented ____.
1. The government's share of the total pie if the game ends peacefully; the extremists' share of what's won from the government if the game ends with popular participation in violence.
 2. The extremists' share of the total pie if the game ends peacefully; the extremists' share of what's won from the government if the game ends with popular participation in violence.
 3. The government's share of the total pie if the game ends peacefully; the public's share of what's won from the government if the game ends with popular participation in violence.
 4. The extremists' share of the total pie if the game ends peacefully; the public's share of what's won from the government if the game ends with popular participation in violence.
59. In the Model of Crisis Bargaining Within States, the extremists are more likely to offer a division of the spoils that the public will accept, ensuring popular participation in violence, as
1. the public's satisfaction with the status quo decreases.
 2. the public's costs of sitting on the sidelines increases.
 3. Neither 1 nor 2
 4. Both 1 and 2
60. A key implication of the theoretical model presented in lecture is that, relative to rich countries, poor countries should see
1. greater levels of mass participation in any political violence that occurs, but are no more nor less prone to episodes of violence.
 2. greater levels of mass participation in any political violence that occurs and should be more prone to episodes of violence.
 3. greater levels of mass participation in any political violence that occurs, but should be less prone to episodes of violence.
 4. lower levels of mass participation in any political violence that occurs, but may be no more nor less prone to episodes of violence.