

GV103: Introduction to International Relations

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Insurgency

Introduction

- Three goals for this lecture
 - Define insurgency
 - Discuss determinants of participation in violence
 - Demonstrate that $\text{pr}(\text{violence})$ might \downarrow as likely participation \uparrow

Definition

Insurgency

A period in which one or more groups seeks to undermine established authority through irregular warfare.



Identity and Conflict


- Three reasons to doubt identity cleavage → conflict
 - No clear evidence ↑ conflict as ↑ cleavages
 - May have direction of causality reversed
 - Assumes away collaboration problem

The Political Salience of Cultural Difference

- Observations: individuals in 4 villages
- y : attitudes towards out-group
- x : nationality


Research Sites

FIGURE 1. Research Sites



Results

FIGURE 2. Chewa—Tumbuka Relations in Zambia and Malawi Compared





Impact of Conflict on Identity

- Observations: random sample from 16 African countries
- y : whether primary identity is ethnic
- x s: targeted by MID, experienced civil war



Results

	Ethnic identity
Targeted by MID	-*
Civil War	+*



Ethnic Defection in the Greek Civil War

- Observations: 63 villages/towns in Greece
- y : # of Nazi collaborators
- x s: pre-war support for regime, civilians killed by insurgents, strength of insurgents

Results

	Nazi collaborators
Support for regime	—
Civilians killed	+*
Strength of insurgents	—*



Selective Incentives

- Observations: random sample of 1000 people in Sierra Leone
- y : participation in war (and which side)
- x s: various measures of selective incentives and likely indicators of grievances against pre-war SQ

Preliminary Evidence

Response	% Yes (RUF)	% Yes (CDF)
Supported Goals	9.6	70.4
Defend Community	1.1	15.8
Was Abducted	87.8	2.0
Fear of Punishment	41.8	51.2

Results

	RUF		CDF volunteer
	Abducted	Volunteer	
House w/ mud walls	+*	+*	+*
No educ access	+*	+*	+*
Ethnic minority	+*	+	+
Politically marginalized	+*	+*	+*
Offered money	+*	+*	+*
Felt safer in group	-*	+*	+*
Friends in group	-*	+*	+

A Model of Political Violence

- G offers x to E
- If E accepts, the game ends peacefully
- If E rejects, violence occurs
- E then offers y of spoils to P
- If P rejects, limited participation in violence
- If P accepts, popular participation in violence
- G uncertain about c_E
- $pr(c_E = \bar{c}_E) = \phi$ and $pr(c_E = \underline{c}_E) = 1 - \phi$

Outcomes	u_G	u_E	u_P
peace	$1 - x$	x	q
limited participation	$1 - \underline{w} - c_G$	$\underline{w} - c_E$	$q - \kappa$
popular participation	$1 - \bar{w} - c_G$	$\bar{w}(1 - y) - c_E$	$\bar{w}y - c_P$



Analysis: Second Stage

- P joins conflict when $u_P(\text{pop}) \geq u_P(\text{lim})$
 - Equivalent to $y \geq \hat{y}$, where $\hat{y} \equiv \frac{q + c_P - \kappa}{\underline{w}}$
- E may not wish to offer $y = \hat{y}$
 - Only does so if $q \leq \hat{q}$, where $\hat{q} \equiv \underline{w} - \frac{w^2}{W} - c_P + \kappa$

E 's Acceptance Rule

- As a general rule, E accepts
 - iff $x \geq \underline{w} - c_E$ when $q > \hat{q}$
 - iff $x \geq \overline{w}(1 - \hat{y}) - c_E$ when $q \leq \hat{q}$
- This gives us 4 critical values of x
 - \underline{x}_I and \overline{x}_I when $q > \hat{q}$
 - \underline{x}_P and \overline{x}_P when $q \leq \hat{q}$

G's Choice of x

- When $q > \hat{q}$
 - G sets $x = \underline{x}_I$ iff $\phi > \hat{\phi}_I$
 - Where $\hat{\phi}_I \equiv \frac{c_G + \underline{c}_E}{c_G + \bar{c}_E}$
- When $q \leq \hat{q}$
 - G sets $x = \underline{x}_P$ iff $\phi > \hat{\phi}_P$
 - Where $\hat{\phi}_P \equiv \frac{c_G + \underline{c}_E + \frac{\bar{w}}{w}(q + c_P - \kappa)}{c_G + \bar{c}_E + \frac{\bar{w}}{w}(q + c_P - \kappa)}$

Summary of Results

	$q > \hat{q}$	$q \leq \hat{q}$
If violence, participation is	Limited	Popular
Risk of violence	Relatively high	Relatively low