

# GV103: Introduction to International Relations

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International Institutions



# Introduction

- Two goals for this lecture
  - Present **epiphenomenal** critique of institutions
  - Discuss when and how they can **solve problems**

# Epiphenomenal?

- If “FB official” couples cheated less, what would that imply?
- FB official  $\leftarrow$  strong commitment  $\rightarrow$  less cheating
- **Most** signatories to international agreements **comply** with the terms of those agreements **most of the time**
- That there is a **pattern of association** is not in dispute
- Whether that reflects  $x \rightarrow y$  or  $x \leftarrow z \rightarrow y$  is

# Facilitating Coordination

- Theory
  - Revisit Model of Coordination
  - Suppose 1 & 2 talk after class, agree to meet at Top Bar
  - Nothing prevents 2 from nonetheless going to Sub Zero
  - But what do you suppose happens to  $p_1$  and  $p_2$ ?
- Examples
  - International Organization for Standardization
  - International Telecommunication Union
  - International Civil Aviation Organization

# Facilitating Collaboration

- Theory
  - Revisit Model of Collaboration
  - Suppose 1 & 2 write down a cleaning schedule
  - Nothing prevents them from violating it
  - If  $c$  high enough, (don't, don't) remains only equilibrium
- Examples
  - Kellogg-Briand Pact
  - Kyoto Protocol

# A Model of Reassurance

- 1 decides whether to propose an agreement to 2
- If 1 does, 2 decides whether to accept or not
- If agreement reached, both incur cost  $\kappa$
- Either way, proceed to following normal-form subgame

	allow	block
allow	$\beta, \beta$	$e_1, \tau_2$
block	$\tau_1, e_2$	$0, 0$

# Analysis

- In the most interesting equilibrium
  - 1 proposes agreement to 2 iff 1 is blue
  - 2 accepts iff 2 is also blue
  - Neither player cooperates unless agreement was reached
  - Agreement reached iff both players blue
- Explanation
  - Players cooperate under same conditions as in Model of Trust
  - Note: requires  $\underline{k} \leq \beta$ ,  $\bar{K} > \bar{\tau}_1$ ,  $\bar{K} > \bar{\tau}_2$

# Applications

- Bilateral trade agreements
- European Union