

PSC 102: Intro to International Politics

Prof. Philip Arena

Domestic Politics

Introduction

- Two goals for this lecture
 - Discuss postwar **peace** in **Western Europe**
 - Discuss **interstate peace** in **Sub-Saharan Africa**

Democratic Peace

- **Correlation** between joint democracy and peace
 - Few clear cut cases of wars between pairs of democracies
 - Militarized disputes between democracies rare as well
- Two types of **causal** explanations
 - Greater **accountability**
 - Externalization of **norms**

Do Democrats Fear Defeat More than Other Leaders?

	% Democrats		% Non-democrats	
	Lost Power	Punished	Lost Power	Punished
After Victory	31%	11%	19%	38%
After Defeat	88%	43%	48%	88%
Difference	57%	32%	29%	50%

- Bigger impact pr(lose power) for democrats
- Bigger impact pr(punishment) for autocrats

Do Democrats Externalize Norms?

- Wars of empire
- Oppression of minorities
- Overthrow of democratically-elected leaders

If Not Democracy, Then What?

- Resolution of **territorial disagreements**
 - Most wars are fought over territory
 - Territorial disagreements inhibit development of democracy
 - Jointly democratic dyads have few territorial disagreements
 - Those they have appear just as likely to escalate

A Model of Simultaneous Inter- and Intra-state Bargaining

- States A and B experience interstate crisis
- A consists of G and O
- G first issues ultimatum x to B
- G then issues ultimatum y to O
- Assume G uncertain about c_B
- $pr(c_B = \bar{c}_B) = \phi$ and $pr(c_B = \underline{c}_B) = 1 - \phi$

Outcomes	u_G	u_O	u_B
peace, peace	$x + y$	$1 - y$	$1 - x$
peace, conflict	$x + \bar{\gamma} - k_G$	$1 - \bar{\gamma} - k_O$	$1 - x$
war, peace	$w - c_A + y$	$1 - y - c_A$	$1 - w - c_B$
war, conflict	$w - c_A + \underline{\gamma} - k_G$	$1 - c_A - \underline{\gamma} - k_O$	$1 - w - c_B$

Analysis: Domestic

- If international stage ended in **war**
 - O accepts iff $y \leq \underline{y}$, where $\underline{y} \equiv \underline{\gamma} + k_O$
 - G sets $y = \underline{y}$
- If international stage ended in **peace**
 - O accepts iff $y \leq \bar{y}$, where $\bar{y} \equiv \bar{\gamma} + k_O$
 - G sets $y = \bar{y}$
- No intrastate conflict **in this model**

Analysis: International

- G faces same tradeoff as in Lecture 21
 - \underline{x} , which is equivalent to $w + \underline{c}_B$, ensures peace
 - \bar{x} , which is equivalent to $w + \bar{c}_B$, risks war
- But must also consider impact of first stage on second
 - $u_G(x = \underline{x}) = \underline{x} + \bar{y}$
 - $E(u_G(x = \bar{x})) = \phi(\bar{x} + \bar{y}) + (1 - \phi)(w - c_A + \underline{y})$
 - Sets $x = \underline{x}$ iff $\phi \leq \hat{\phi}$, where $\hat{\phi} \equiv \frac{c_A + \underline{c}_B + \bar{\gamma} - \underline{\gamma}}{c_A + \bar{c}_B + \bar{\gamma} - \underline{\gamma}}$

Implications

- Probability of interstate war \uparrow as $\bar{\gamma} \downarrow$
- In recent decades, threat **greatest** in **Sub-Saharan Africa**

